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The Trent Affair: Avoiding a Possible Crisis during the Civil War
In November 1861, Union Naval Captain Charles Wilkes seized the Trent, a British
mailing ship, because it was transporting two Confederate diplomats, John Slidell and James
Mason. Wilkes captured the two Confederate representatives due to what he considered were
treasonous actions against the Union, but he did so without any orders from the Union
government.1 Under a proclamation issued by the Queen of Britain at the start of the Civil War,
Britain recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent and was not supposed to transport the
dispatches of Slidell and Mason because international law considered them contraband.2 Yet, by
acknowledging the Confederacy as belligerent, Britain stated that the Union and the Confederacy
would be given equal treatment in British ports. Confederate ships could obtain necessary
supplies from British ports to aid them in fighting Union ships. Northerners expected British
support and were dismayed by the British acknowledgement of the Confederacy. The Trent
Affair escalated the already unpopular opinion towards Britain held by the Union public due to
the Queen’s Proclamation. The Union publically celebrated the actions of Wilkes as the first
naval success against the Confederacy. Newspapers depicted the British as trying to take away
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the victory and, as a result, helping facilitate negotiations with the Confederates. Union citizens
did not want to concede to British demands to give up the rebels. Northerners felt that if Britain
wanted to go to war over the Trent Affair, then they would mobilize for such a conflict. The
Lincoln administration did not want to give any indication to the Confederacy that the British
could have their way with the Union, for that would just inspire the Confederacy to strive for
British support. President Lincoln dealt with the public pressure, while also receiving
correspondence from government officials. However, the advice Lincoln received urged him to
concede to Britain’s demands, which went against the public’s wish to fight Britain. By adhering
to British demands concerning the Trent Affair, Lincoln sacrificed public opinion for his
decision to maintain peaceful relations with Britain. Lincoln had the greater goal of reunifying
the United States and he did not want to hinder reunification by expanding the war
internationally.
To understand the heated public opinion over the Trent Affair, President Lincoln
considered the previous relationship between Britain and the United States. British aristocrats
identified with southern Americans in that their political leadership was similar. Historian Dean
B. Mahin explains, “Southern leadership was drawn from a plantation aristocracy with many
similarities to the agrarian aristocracy that still dominated British politics and British
governments.”3 The ruling class in Britain was worried that if the popular democracy of the
North prevailed, there would be increased pressure in Britain to open representation to lower
class workers and women. The British also kept their economic interest in mind when it came to
supporting the North or the South. The South exported cotton to Britain and were consumers of
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British industry, while the North was a competitor to Britain because of its own industrial
developments. Britain and the South were both against the protective tariff placed on northern
goods to protect from British competition. Southerners argued that the protective tariff was only
in place to benefit the North as it fell disproportionally on the South. Therefore, Britons had
political and economic reasons for feeling more sympathetic to the Confederate cause.
The Union came face to face with British support for the Confederacy when Queen
Victoria issued Britain’s proclamation of neutrality. The Queen’s proclamation proved to support
both the Union and the Confederacy, which was not anticipated by the Lincoln administration.4
The proclamation profited the Union because Britain offered its acceptance of the blockade
instituted by Lincoln to cut off southern ports. Yet, the proclamation also benefitted the
Confederacy because it acknowledged it as a belligerent, therefore, making the Union and
Confederacy equal in terms of rights for belligerent nations. Under the proclamation, the Union
and the Confederacy both had the ability to acquire fuel, supplies, and repairs in British ports.5
Union public opinion responded with condemnation of British support of the Confederacy, “The
latter aspect of the proclamation precipitated a roar of disapproval from Northerners, who had no
patience for the intricate arguments of international law that justified the British action.”6
Northerners expected British support due to the fact that this was a civil war caused by slavery
and Britain was leading international abolition efforts by banning slavery in its colonies and
stopping the slave trade anywhere it could. To respond to the proclamation of neutrality and the
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outraged Americans, Lincoln’s administration initially took the position that if Britain were to
have relations with the Confederates then the Union would cease to continue relations with
Britain.7
The Trent Affair occurred in the midst of these previously established tensions between
the Union and Great Britain and the public within the Union was quick to analyze who should
bear the blame. The Lowell Daily Citizen and News took the position that Britain was violating
its proclamation of neutrality by letting Confederate diplomats James Mason and John Slidell
aboard the British mailing ship the Trent. The article stated that the captain of the Trent should
have been aware of his nation’s law of neutrality and he also should have been aware that Mason
and Slidell were working in aggression against the Union. The article concluded, “It would be
hard practice to condemn the conduct of Wilkes on the ground of another party’s ignorance of
law, or what may be regarded as having all the force of law. We suppose the presumption of law
is that every subject has knowledge of its requirements.”8 The Union public felt all the blame
should be put on the captain of the Trent, due to his allowance of Mason and Slidell on board.
However, not every citizen knew what was considered legal under the proclamation of neutrality
and international naval law, which ironically, Union newspapers were criticizing the captain of
the Trent for. International law required Wilkes to find Confederate dispatches aboard the Trent
and bring the ship to a prize court in Union territory. However, Wilkes did not find any
dispatches and took it upon himself to arrest the rebels without a decision from a prize court. The
public did not entertain the possibility that Wilkes’ victory was illegal under international law or
consider the implications of war with Britain. Yet, despite public elation for his efforts, Wilkes

7 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American
Civil War (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999) 30 and 49.
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had disrespected the British flag and the Lincoln administration had to consider seriously the
possibility of an international conflict.
On November 18, 1861, President Lincoln received a letter from Thomas Ewing, a
senator in Ohio and supporter of the Union.9 Ewing explicitly expressed his concern about the
Trent incident based on how various newspapers responded to the event. Ewing’s worry was that
Britain would see the arrest of Mason and Slidell as an infringement on the rights of the British
to carry two Confederate representatives without dispatches. Even though Ewing knew Lincoln
did not order Captain Wilkes to arrest them, he stated, “It is not yet in fact the wrong of the U.S.,
but of the commanding officer, for the boarding and arrest under the British flag was not ordered
by you—and now the Law of Nations requires that you disavow the act.” Ewing advised Lincoln
to withhold support of Captain Wilkes’ actions and to correct this violation of law by allowing
Mason and Slidell to board a British ship and proceed to their destination without interruption. 10
Ewing seemed to have faith in Britain’s proclamation of neutrality because he was not worried
about the two diplomats reaching Britain, he was more worried about the British using the Trent
Affair as an excuse to weaken the Union through war. The British despised the economic
competition that the North created and a war would be the opportunity the British needed to
remove their rivals.

9 R. Owen Williams, “Ewing, Thomas,” American National Biography Online, accessed
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10 Thomas Ewing to Abraham Lincoln, November 18, 1861, transcribed and annotated by
the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, available at Abraham Lincoln
Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory
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Ewing’s opinion was unlike the popular opinion of the public in the North, as northerners
saw the capture of Mason and Slidell as a triumph over Confederate forces. While it appeared
that Ewing expressed support of the Southern position by allowing the representatives to reach
Britain, his intent was not to further the Confederacy’s objective to gain support from abroad. He
believed that the acceptance of Britain’s demands was the only way to prevent a conflict with the
British. Ewing stated, “—and in order to repair this wrong and cause that immunity to have been,
and still to be absolute, England may rightfully demand that the prisoners be placed as nearly as
possible in status quo—That is to say—that they be placed on board a British ship and suffered
to pursue their journey without interruption—.”11 While not in support of the southern position,
Ewing advised Lincoln to enable the southern diplomats in reaching Britain. Public opinion in
the Union was against Ewing’s position, for they felt that Mason and Slidell were acting as
traitors and should not be allowed to carry out their mission. Also, the public was not concerned
with provoking an international war by keeping the diplomats in custody in Union territory. The
public felt that if Britain truly wanted a war, the Lincoln administration would mobilize for one.
However, President Lincoln agreed with Ewing in that he did not want Britain to use the Trent
Affair as justification for war, but he also had to combat his own concerns of disagreeing with
the public by releasing the envoys.
By December 16, 1861, President Lincoln also received correspondence from former
president Millard Fillmore. Fillmore was in support of Lincoln’s stand against the Confederacy
and did not want to lose hope in the unification of the United States by risking a larger war with
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Britain. Possible consequences of war with Britain were the acknowledgement of the
Confederacy as independent, a break in Lincoln’s blockade proclamation, and the opening of
free trade to British producers. Therefore, both the Union and Confederacy would be dependent
on British manufacturing.12 These were the fears that Fillmore and other Union government
officials were concerned about. However, unlike Ewing, Fillmore did not want to adhere to the
demands of Britain, for he felt it was an issue worthy of arbitration by a neutral nation’s crowned
head. Fillmore claimed that, “by urging in a firm but conciliatory argument in reply to the
demand of Great Britain, our views of the Belligerent right to arrest these men, but conclude by
saying that although we feel assured that we are right, …no insult was intended to the flag of
Great Britain.” With this suggestion, Fillmore wanted to make the Trent issue into an effort to
settle international naval law for future conflicts between any and all nations. Fillmore’s ideas
are ideal to handling the situation, while also appeasing the public. If a neutral arbitrator,
specifically a crowned head from Europe, assessed the Trent Affair, then Lincoln would not have
to give in to the demands of Britain unless it was the verdict of the arbitration.13 Lincoln would
not be subject to public dissent, for a legal decision would be responsible for the Union abiding
by Britain’s demands.
On December 26, 1861, the New York Times reported that Britain’s demands included
“an apology, and the restitution of Mason and Slidell to British custody.” 14 President Lincoln
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took Ewing’s and Fillmore’s counsel into account when deciding how to answer the demands of
Britain in his December 1861 “Memorandum on the Trent Affair.” Lincoln explained his
position on the issue. For example, he stated that Wilkes did not have orders from the Union for
the arrest and there was no intention to insult the British flag.15 President Lincoln was under
extreme pressure from Britain to conform to their demands, for the British ambassador to the
Union, Lord Lyons, gave a seven-day deadline for a response. If this deadline was not met, Lord
Lyons was instructed by official dispatches to depart for London with his staff so Britain could
prepare for war.16 Yet, Lincoln also did not want to risk hurting the public morale that Wilkes’
actions inspired within the Union. Succumbing to British demands meant disregarding the
public’s desire to give credence to Wilkes’ actions and promote them as a victory for the Union.
Lincoln’s memorandum, which was never sent, exemplified his initial position to deny full
responsibility for the issue and he urged Britain to consider her role in the affair. “The President
desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the
United States—the position Great Britain has assumed, including Her Majesty’s proclamation, in
relation thereto—the relation the persons, whose seizure is the subject of complaint.” With these
initial efforts, Lincoln sought to appeal to the public’s opinion by not giving in to Britain. He
insisted that Britain understand the state of rebellion the United States was in and consider the
position Britain assumed under the Queen’s Proclamation.
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In his memorandum, Lincoln asked for friendly arbitration instead of openly releasing
Mason and Slidell.17 However, Lincoln’s memorandum was never sent, as he explained, “I found
I could not make an argument that would satisfy my own mind.” The memorandum was purely a
tool for Lincoln to experiment with his position on the issue. Lincoln’s argument in the
memorandum was based on the process of arbitration, as Fillmore had advised. Typically,
arbitration was used for boundary disputes and financial claims, in which case a crowned head
working as a neutral arbitrator would settle. Yet, “the arbitration process was ill suited for the
resolution of conflicts in which either side thought its national honor was threatened.” 18 National
honor proved to be too subjective of a concept to be determined by arbitration, as it was not as
concrete as a boundary dispute. Lincoln turned to Secretary of State William Seward, who
constructed a response that delivered Mason and Slidell to British forces, but also argued in
defense of Wilkes. As a result, Lincoln’s administration provided a response to the Trent Affair
that satisfied British demands.
Union public opinion responded to the concessions made by the Lincoln administration
with disappointment. Attorney General Edward Bates wrote of the, “great reluctance on the part
of some of the members of the cabinet—and even the President himself” due to the worry of “the
displeasure of our own people—lest they should accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of
England.” President Lincoln understood the necessity of having a united Union citizenry and he
was worried that by succumbing to British demands, he would create a divide between the public
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and the Union government.19 The Daily Evening Traveler published an article stating the
discontent felt by the public, “It is not too much to say that the announcement of the decision of
the government in regard to the Trent affair, has been received by the public with profound and
unprecedented regret, mingled not only with indignation, but with extreme bitterness toward
England.”20 This article provided an answer to Lincoln’s worries, for the public response
remained anti-British instead of against the Lincoln administration. Public sentiment was for
addressing Britain diplomatically, but Lincoln understood that the consequences of standing up
to Britain diplomatically would have led to war. Avoiding conflict with Britain outweighed the
advantage of appealing to public opinion. The response to Lincoln’s decision in Union
newspapers helped turn public opinion to accept the results of the affair. The New York Herald
stated, “In adopting this alternative of submission to these peremptory demands, the
administration runs the hazard of disappointing the popular sentiment of our loyal States. But a
little reflection will satisfy every intelligent mind of the wisdom of deferring a final settlement
with England until we shall have made and end of this Southern rebellion.” 21 Citizens remained
united in the idea that the British were taking advantage of the Union in its weakened state and
they could not blame Lincoln for giving in to British demands. 22 Lincoln’s actions were
successful in evading war with Britain and his next task involved dispelling the public’s anger
against Britain by directing their focus toward the reunification of the United States.

19 Norman B. Ferris, The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1977) 185.
20 “The Trent Case,” Daily Evening Traveller, December 31, 1861: 1.
21 “Important from Washington: Mason and Slidell to be Delivered up If Demanded,”
The New York Herald, December 21, 1861: 4.
22 Gordon H. Warren, Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981) 208.
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As a result of the Trent Affair, Lincoln was able to avoid a war with Britain, but was left
to quell the anti-British public opinion that spread throughout the Union. Northerners expected
the support of Britain in the beginning of the Civil War and the Queen’s Proclamation of
neutrality came as an angry shock to the public. After the Trent Affair transpired, the Union
citizenry and press responded with immense approval of Captain Wilkes’ actions. Union
newspapers reported that Wilkes captured the first naval victory for the Union. Adhering to
British demands was to throw away the triumph of Wilkes and Lincoln did not want to
disappoint the public. Thomas Ewing warned Lincoln that he should not allow the British to use
the Trent Affair as an excuse to attack the already weakened Union. Millard Fillmore agreed
with Ewing, but wanted to solve the issue through arbitration. Lincoln adopted both Ewing’s and
Fillmore’s considerations and developed a memorandum in response to the crisis. Even though
Lincoln never sent his memorandum, it was an example of his efforts to understand the Trent
Affair personally.23 He was much more focused on the reunification of the United States and he
did not want the Trent Affair to be the crisis that ruined his goal. Therefore, Lincoln had to
sacrifice public dissent for the greater cause of the Union, that being fighting the Civil War. The
Trent Affair resulted in an anti-British citizenry, but it set the precedent for future peaceful
Anglo-American relations.
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